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Abstract—Over  the  last  decade,  a  sophisticated  underground 
economy has emerged over the Internet in which cybercriminals 
collaborate  and  trade  different  goods  and  services.  This  study 
takes a unique approach towards understanding the functioning 
of the underground economy by focusing on the social dynamics 
between the cybercriminals. Using anonymized private messaging 
records  from  four  underground  forums  formerly  operating  as 
online black markets, this study aims to examine the structural 
properties of the networks of personal interactions between the 
cybercriminals  and  to  turn  the  findings  into  actionable 
intelligence for tackling the problem of profit-driven cybercrime. 
Keywords-social  network  analysis;  cybercrime;  carding; 
underground economy 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Over the last decade, the nature of cybercrime has shifted 
from  naive  vandalism  to  profit  driven  and  this  led  to  the 
emergence of a sophisticated underground economy [27]. One 
of the major sources of profit that is driving this underground 
economy is carding, a type of identity theft that involves the 
unauthorized use of credit and debit card account information 
to fraudulently purchase goods and services [24]. The scope of 
the term has evolved over the past few years to encompass a 
broader range of related activities including hacking, phishing 
and auction frauds. Carders, those who commit carding related 
crimes, began by using the Internet Relay Chat (IRC) channels 
[8, 27] to trade goods and services with one another. Labor 
specialization  [17]  has  emerged  in  this  sophisticated 
“underground  economy”  with  several  key  roles  including 
carders, cashiers, malware authors, drops, money mules and 
also, dishonest traders known as the “rippers”. These “rippers” 
represent  a  “tax”  on  the  goods  and  services  traded  in  the 
underground economy [10]. To avoid this “tax”, many carders 
have formed closed knit carding groups in the form of closed 
membership online forums [33]. 
In collaboration with the Serious Organised Crime Agency 
(SOCA)  from  the  U.K.,  this  study  takes  a  unique  approach 
towards  understanding  the  functioning  of  the  underground 
economy  by  focusing  on  the  social  dynamics  between 
cybercriminals. This could bring about a new set of insights 
into  cybersecurity  research  because  as  McIllwain  [15]  note, 
“[T]he  least  common  denominator  of  organized  crime  is 
human relationships; specifically human relationships engaged 
in the process of social networking for the provision of illicit 
goods and services as well as the protection, regulation and 
extortion of those engaged in the provision or consumption of 
these goods and services. This process of social networking 
occurs as part of a social system of organized crime, a system 
which explains the remarkable consistency of the process of 
organizing crime across time and space”.  
Using  anonymized  private  messaging  records  from  four 
well  known  carding  forums:  Carderplanet,  Shadowcrew, 
Cardersmarket and Darkmarket [9], this study has the unique 
opportunity  to  examine  the  actual  social  interactions  which 
have  taken  place  in  the  underground  economy.  More 
specifically, by using social network analysis techniques, this 
paper aims to uncover the underlying network topology of the 
carding forums, the structural properties of these networks, the 
behavioral preferences of the cybercriminals and take the first 
steps  towards  understanding  the  network  topology  of  the 
underground  economy  as  a  whole.  It  is  hoped  that  such 
insights would allow authorities to better utilize their resources 
and devise more effective disruption strategies in the future. 
II.  MOTIVATION AND RELATED WORKS 
  Thomas  and  Martin  [27]  were  the  first  to  describe  the 
functioning of the underground economy on IRC. Franklin et 
al performed a detailed quantitative analysis of underground 
trading on IRC [8]. The underworld of botnets is introduced 
by Mielke and Chen [16]. 
  The  network  analysis  approach  taken  in  this  study  is 
motivated  by  a  number  of  studies  [13,  18,  31,  32],  which 
collectively demonstrate that  significant insights into “dark” 
networks  can  be  found  by  studying  the  structure  of  those 
networks. This study aims to uncover similar insights in the 
domains of carding.  
  Lastly,  a  recent  study  analyzed  six  underground  forums 
including  a  German  carding  forum  called  carders.cc  [19]. 
Their analysis includes both public posts and private messages 
by using content analysis to examine the impact of user ratings 
and  user  behavior.  This  paper  differs  from  their  work  by 
focusing  specifically  on  the  topological  properties  of  the 
private messaging (PM) social network on the carding forums. 
III.  RESEARCH DESIGN 
In this study,  we have access to the anonymized private 
messaging (PM) records from four well known carding forums: ShadowCrew  (SC),  Carderplanet  (CP),  Cardersmarket  (CM) 
and Darkmarket (DM). The forums are deliberately chosen for 
their  chronological  order  of  existence  over  time  which 
represents  the  development  of  carding  as  an  underground 
business [9]. Their general statistics are shown in table I. 
TABLE I.   GENERAL STATISTICS OF THE CARDING FORUMS 
  CP  SC  CM  DM 
Years in operation  2001 - 
2004 
2002 - 
2004 
2005 - 
2007 
2005 - 
2008 
No. of users  6813  4430  2759  2075 
No. of  PMs  28503  69126  24571  15433 
A.  Carding Forums 
Much like conventional online discussion forums, carding 
forums are used mainly for trading carding goods and services 
as those described by Thomas and Martin [27]. However, each 
forum is further divided into a series of sub-forums which are 
dedicated to tutorials, discussions and “ripper” lists. Users can 
start topics, also known as threads, which others can reply to. 
The forums also offer private messaging functionality and this 
is of particular interest to this study for two reasons.   
Firstly, due to the potential criminal nature of the activities 
the forum members were engaged in, detailed conversations 
such  as  business  negotiations  were  often  carried  out  using 
private messaging.     
Secondly, a private messaging dialogue between two users 
represents a direct connection between the two and thus can be 
used to assert the existence of a personal relationship between 
any  pair  of  the  carding  forum  members.  This  is  a  more 
accurate  estimation  of  the  relationships  between  the  forum 
members than reply graphs which are often constructed using 
public  dialogues  [3].  The  following  section  describes  the 
modelling approach used in this study. 
B.  Private Messaging (PM) Social Networks 
In  this  study,  we  model  the  private  messaging  (PM) 
interaction data as a graph where a user is represented by a 
node and a PM is represented by an edge (undirected) or arc 
(directed). Two different types of graphs are used for different 
measurements. 
For analyzing degree distribution, assortativity, rich club 
phenomenon, components, and reciprocity, we model the data 
as a directed simple graph [29] G = <V, E> where: 
1.  V  =  {v1,  v2…vx}  is  a  set  of  nodes  in  which  each  v 
represents  a  member  of  the  forum  who  have  sent  or 
received at least one PM. 
2.  E = {e1, e2…ey} is an ordered set of weighted directed 
edges  (called  arcs)  and  each  arc  represents  a  private 
message sent between two users. The direction of the arc 
represents  the  direction  of  the  communication.  The 
weight of an arc represents the number of PMs sent in a 
particular direction between two nodes. 
Thus, the resulting graph is a directed simple graph with no 
self-loop and no multi-edge between any pair of nodes [29]. 
For  analyzing  clustering,  diameter,  path  lengths  and 
cohesive subgroups, we model the data as an undirected graph 
where the existence of a PM between two nodes is represented 
by an edge regardless of direction. The weight of an edge is 
the  combined  frequency  of  PMs  sent  in  either  direction 
between two nodes. 
IV.  RESULTS 
The network properties of the PM social graphs are shown 
in  table  II.  It  can  be  seen  that  even  with  fewer  nodes, 
Shadowcrew  hosts  the  PM  social  network  with  most 
connections, the highest mean degree and highest reciprocity 
rate.  
TABLE II.   NETWORK PROPERTIES OF THE PM SOCIAL GRAPHS 
  CP  SC  CM  DM 
No. of nodes v  3327  2285  2149  1716 
No. of arcs a  13429  23039  11710  10149 
No. of edges e  10160  14720  9433  7540 
jmax or kmax  123  334  128  196 
<j> or <k>  4.04  10.08  5.45  5.91 
xmax  144  353  249  839 
<x>  6.11  12.88  8.78  8.79 
i  0.24  0.36  0.26  0.26 
dun  0.0018  0.0056  0.0041  0.0051 
* jmax is the max in-degree of the network; kmax is the max out-
degree of the network; <j> and <k>  is the mean in- and out-
degree respectively; xmax is the max degree of the undirected 
graph;  <x>  and  dun  is  the  mean  degree  and  density  of  the 
undirected graph; i is the reciprocity of the directed network;  
A.  Degree Distribution 
First  proposed  by  Barabási  and  Albert  [4],  power  law 
degree distributions have since been found to be prevalent in 
many different types of networks [6, 22]. Formally speaking, a 
power law degree distribution is defined by P(x) ~ x
-α where 
the exponent
 α is free of a characteristic scale, hence systems 
with such a degree distribution are  said to be scale-free [4]. 
This property is explained by two social processes: growth and 
linear preferential attachment. To find out whether the carding 
social networks are scale-free, the Complementary Cumulative 
Distribution Function (CCDF) of the in-degree and out-degree 
distribution are plotted, as shown in fig. 1 and 2 respectively. 
The  maximum  likelihood  estimates  of  the  distribution 
parameters are given in table III. 
To our surprise, it was found that none of the in- and out-
degree distributions follow a power law. Rather, they follow a 
lognormal distribution, an alternative distribution very similar 
to  the  power  law  [2,  6].  This  indicates  that  non-linear 
preferential  attachment  exists  in  the  social  networks  with  a 
fraction of links established randomly [11, 23].  The relative 
straight  tail  indicates  that  preferential  attachment  exceeds 
randomness in link distribution [11]. This means that members  Figure 1.  CCDF of in-degree 
of the carding forums mostly interact with each other with a 
specific preference (e.g. reputation of a vendor) but some do  
interact  randomly,  perhaps  for  finding  new  business 
opportunities in the wild. This also reflects the mixed nature of 
carding forums, which operate as online black markets as well 
as  social  networking  services  where  members  can  meet 
likeminded others. 
TABLE III.   PARAMETERS OF THE LOGNORMAL DISTRIBUTIONS 
  CP  SC  CM  DM 
μin  1.50  2.46  1.62  1.21 
σin  1.20  1.48  1.29  1.34 
μout  1.68  2.42  1.85  1.83 
σout  1.22  1.46  1.37  1.29 
*μ is the mean and σ is the standard deviation 
B.  Assortativity 
A network demonstrates assortative mixing if nodes have a 
preference  to  associate  with  others  who  are  similarly  well 
connected [20]. Since the observed network in this case is a 
communication  network  via  private  messaging,  the 
assortativity  between  the  in-degree  and  out-degree  of  the 
senders  and  recipients  are  calculated  using  the  following 
definition as proposed by Newman [21]: 
r = ∑jk jk(ejk – qj
inqk
out) / σinσout 
where j is the in-degree of the sender, k is the out-degree of 
the receiver, q
 represents the distribution of the relevant excess 
degree and σ represents the relevant standard deviation. 
As  shown  in  table  IV,  run  represents  the  correlation 
between  the  degree  of  the  sender  and  the  recipient  on  an 
undirected  graph.  All  networks  are  disassortatively  mixed, 
meaning that high degree nodes prefer to connect with low  
Figure 2.  CCDF of out-degree 
degree nodes and vice versa. The remaining four assortativity 
coefficients measure the assortativity of the in-degree and out-
degree of senders and recipients on a directed graph, which are 
all negative. 
This  suggests  that  there  could  be  a  positive  correlation 
between  node-wise  in-degree  and  out-degree.  In  order  to 
verify this claim, the probability density function (p.d.f.) of the 
joint in- and out-degree distribution is plotted, as shown in fig. 
3. It shows that there is a clear positive correlation between the 
in-degree  and  out-degree  of  each  node,  meaning  that  users 
with  low  in-degree  are  also  highly  likely  to  have  low  out-
degree and vice-versa. 
TABLE IV.   ASSORTATIVITY OF NETWORK DEGREE 
  run  rin-in  rin-out  rout-in  rout-out 
CP  -0.10  -0.11  -0.04  -0.10  -0.04 
SC  -0.16  -0.15  -0.14  -0.16  -0.14 
CM  -0.17  -0.14  -0.04  -0.17  -0.10 
DM  -0.13  -0.19  -0.10  -0.22  -0.11 
 
Overall, all four carding social networks are disassortative 
indicating that low-degree nodes tend to connect with high-
degree nodes. This suggests that in general, forum members 
are  preferentially  attached  by  connectivity.  Indeed,  on  an 
asynchronous  carding  forum,  a  vendor’s  in-degree  and  out-
degree is likely to increment proportionally over time because 
more and more members  would see his adverts and contact 
him privately for negotiations. On the other hand, the buyers 
who contact the vendors using PM may not be active members 
of the forum, thus the networks are disassortatively mixed. 
C.  Rich-club Phenomenon 
The rich-club phenomenon is a relatively new concept and 
is defined by Colizza et al [7] as the tendency of high-degree 
nodes to be very well-connected to each other. In other words,  Figure 3.  Probability density function (p.d.f.) of joint degree distribution 
it measures whether the high-degree nodes are more likely to 
form  well  connected  subgraphs  or  “clubs”,  than  low-degree 
nodes.  φ(x)  >  1  indicates  that  there  is  rich-club  behavior 
whereas φ(x) < 1 indicate that there is an opposing behavior 
present. It is important to note that rich-club phenomenon can 
exist  in  the  absence  of  degree  assortativity  because  it  is  a 
measure of the connectivity among high degree nodes, not a 
measure of the general mixing properties of the network [7]. 
Here,  we  use  this  metric  to  examine  the  distribution  of 
disassortativity across the networks. 
As shown in fig. 4, all four social networks exhibit similar 
rich-club behavior where there is an opposing behavior present 
for nodes with degree of approximately 10
2. This means that 
these well-connected nodes are not interconnected and this is 
in direct contrast to the scientific collaboration network [7]. 
This  hints  at  the  presence  of  a  social  process  that  opposes 
collaboration.  Since  the  carding  forums  are  online  black 
markets,  one  explanation  for  this  observation  is  the 
competition between the vendors.   
Furthermore, fig. 4 shows that nodes with the lowest and 
highest degrees do not exhibit any distinctive behavior. Since 
new forum members are most likely to have lowest degrees 
and forum administrators are most likely to have the highest 
PM degrees, this suggests  that  members of these two types 
engage  in  a  balanced  mixture  of  random  and  preferential 
interactions. 
D.  Transitivity and Small World 
Transitivity measures the likelihood that “the friend of my 
friend  is  also  my  friend”  and  is  commonly  referred  to  as 
clustering.  Two  different  methods  are  used  to  measure  the 
level of clustering in the social graphs: transitivity T [29] and 
clustering coefficient C [30]. 
The transitivity T and the clustering coefficient C of the 
four PM social graphs are as shown in table V which shows 
Figure 4.  Rich-club phenomenon 
that all four PM social networks have a much higher clustering 
coefficient  and  transitivity  than  their  random  counterparts 
denoted by Crandom and Trandom. This shows that all four carding 
forums are highly clustered. 
Furthermore, the distribution of the clustering coefficient C 
is shown in fig. 5. It is evident from the figure that clustering 
coefficient is inversely proportional to degree x. As Ravasz 
and  Barabási  [25]  argue,  this  indicates  the  existence  of  a 
hierarchical architecture in the network. 
TABLE V.   CLUSTERING COEFFICIENT AND TRANSITIVITY 
  CP  SC  CM  DM 
C  0.036  0.117  0.089  0.078 
T  0.034  0.066  0.048  0.032 
Crandom  0.0013  0.0053  0.0039  0.0052 
Trandom  0.0016  0.0052  0.0037  0.0052 
   
Although the scaling parameter is less than 0.5 in the four 
networks, which is less than the bounds of 0.75 to 1 suggested 
by Ravasz and Barabási, this nonetheless suggests that there 
exists  a  slight  hierarchical  architecture.  There  are  two 
explanations  for  this:  firstly,  the  carding  forums  are 
hierarchically  managed  with  roles  such  as  administrators, 
moderators, reviewers and reviewed vendors [33]. Secondly, 
the disassortativity in buyer-seller relationships can also create 
the hierarchical configuration described in [25]. 
Lastly, as Watts and Strogatz [30] argue, most real world 
networks  are  small  worlds  as  they  exhibit  two  fundamental 
characteristics: highly clustered like regular graphs and have 
short path lengths like random graphs. In order to determine 
whether  the  four  PM  social  graphs  are  small  worlds,  the 
diameter  D  and  the  average  shortest  path  length  p  are  as 
shown in table VI. It is evident that the four social networks Figure 5.  Local clustering coefficient distribution 
have  approximately  identical  path  lengths  as  their  random 
counterpart. Thus, all four social networks are small worlds. 
TABLE VI.   DIAMETER AND AVERAGE SHORTEST PATH LENGTH 
  CP  SC  CM  DM 
D  9  6  8  7 
Drandom  9  5  7  7 
p  4.18  3.14  3.41  2.93 
prandom  4.7  3.31  3.8  3.7 
 
E.  Connectivity and Cohesive Subgroups 
The findings on Weakly Connected  Components (WCC) 
and Strongly Connected Components (SCC) are presented in 
table VII. Like many other social networks [22], we find that 
each undirected graph consists of a giant WCC with size of 
over 98% of the  nodes. However,  with direction  taken into 
account, we observe a distinctively different pattern. As shown 
in  Table  VII,  Shadowcrew  has  by  far  the  largest  SCC 
consisting  of  over  85%  of  all  nodes,  which  is  astonishing 
when compared with other studies on directed networks, such 
as the World Wide Web [5] and Twitter [12]. This suggests 
that more dialogues are held using PM on Shadowcrew than 
the other networks. 
TABLE VII.   WEAKLY AND STRONGLY CONNECTED COMPONENTS 
  CP  SC  CM  DM 
No. of WCC  29  3  7  1 
No. of SCC  1415  334  1161  773 
Size of largest WC (%)  98.29  99.82  99.40  100 
Size of largest SC (%)  56.81  85.34  45.93  54.78 
 
Lastly, we examine the connectivity of the graphs using  
Figure 6.  Distribution of k-cores 
the concept of k-core, which is defined as a subgraph in which 
each node is connected to a minimum of k neighbors [29].  
As shown in fig. 6, the rapid decay of k-core sizes towards 
the central core is similar to that of the MSN Messenger social 
network [14], indicating that each PM network also consists of 
only  a  very  small  dense  core.  Furthermore,  Carderplanet  is 
found to have the smallest range of k-cores and as shown in 
table  II,  it  is  the  least  dense  network.  On  the  other  hand, 
Shadowcrew is the densest network with a total of 18 k-cores. 
This shows that the number of k-cores and the global density 
of the networks are correlated. 
V.  IMPLICATIONS AND DISCUSSION 
In this study, we have found that although there is evidence 
of  preferential  attachment  and  growth,  the  carding  social 
networks  are  not  scale-free  as  the  degree  distributions  are 
lognormal. This indicates the presence of a mixture of random 
and  preferential  attachment  [11,  23]  and  this  has  important 
implications on network disruption. It is widely accepted that 
scale-free  networks  are  particularly  resilient  against  random 
node  removals  [1,  22,  28]  but  highly  vulnerable  against 
targeted attacks because there is only a small fraction of nodes 
possessing the majority of links. Since the degree distributions 
in the carding social networks are lognormal, this means that 
there are less  highly connected  nodes and  more  moderately 
connected nodes [2]. This implies that the networks are more 
robust against targeted attacks than scale-free networks as well 
as more resilient against random node removals than random 
networks [26]. However, targeted attacks remain particularly 
suitable  against  carding  social  networks  because  they  are 
disassortatively mixed, which means that high- and medium-
degree nodes (e.g. forum administrators and popular members) 
are  well  spatially  distributed  within  the  network  thus  the 
removal of the  well connected nodes has a  well distributed 
impact on the entire network [20].  
We can also use our findings to speculate on the disruption 
of carding activities on other channels, such as the IRC. Since 
 all carders want to avoid rippers, they would always prefer to 
trade  with  reputable  or  trusted  vendors.  Hence,  reliable 
vendors are likely to build up large network degree over time. 
However, without a public reference to the trustworthiness of 
the vendors as that offered by the forums through rating and 
reviews, carders on other networks would be forced to interact 
more randomly in search for business opportunities. Therefore, 
we  believe  that  the  topology  of  other  carding  networks  are 
likely to demonstrate stronger lognormal degree distributions, 
disassortativity and with an absence of rich-club phenomenon. 
With regards to network disruption, it would be more difficult 
for  law  enforcement  to  target  the  key  individuals  on  such 
networks due to the lack of information available. Since many 
carders  operate  on  forums  as  well  as  other  networks,  we 
propose  that  rather  than  looking  to  disrupt  carding  forums, 
authorities should utilize them for intelligence gathering. 
Lastly,  the  carders  have  demonstrated  a  strong  need  for 
effective  communication  by  repeatedly  choosing  to  use  a 
hierarchical  system  such  as  a  forum,  despite  numerous 
successful penetrations by law enforcements [9]. Indeed as we 
have shown, the social networks on these forums exhibit small 
world  characteristics  which  are  ideal  conditions  for 
collaboration and information flow [30]. Therefore, it can be 
said  that  cybercriminals  are  willing  to  trade  security  for  a 
certain level of efficiency [18]. This suggests that authorities 
should aim at limiting the number of tools cybercriminals can 
use to increase their efficiency, such as the use of forums. 
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